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BIANNUAL SURVEY
CPLR 308(1): Personal service held valid where papers served by
party who merely found them.
In Erale v. Edwards,24 service of summons and complaint was
held proper where the papers were delivered to the defendant by
the janitor of an apartment house where she resided. The janitor
had found them in an empty apartment and was not himself a party
to the action. The defendant appeared in the action, and in her
answer asserted the defense of improper service of the summons
and complaint. This fact and the fact that CPLR. 308(1) was
literally complied with,25 led the court to conclude that even though
the process server did not serve the papers as plaintiff intended,
service was nevertheless sufficient.
Formerly, delivery of the summons through the intermediary
of a defendant's husband was held not to fulfill the requirement
of personal delivery.2  However, cases where delivery was made
to a member of the defendant's family upheld service which had
reached the defendant even though not delivered directly to him
by the plaintiff's agent.27  In the instant case, however, mere
fortuitous circumstances enabled the defendant to acquire the notice
to which he is entitled under due process. Service upon a
member of defendant's family is statutorily permitted in some states.
Under CPLR 308(3), after diligent efforts at personal service have
proven fruitless, service may be made by mailing and delivering
a summons to a person of suitable age and discretion at defendant's
dwelling house, usual place of abode or place of business. In
the instant case, it could not have been reasonably contended that
the provisions of CPLR 308(3) were met.
Of course, it can be argued that as long as the defendant
personally receives a copy of the summons (and thus, is given his
due notice) there should be no ground for complaint on his part.
For that matter, the very fact that the defendant appears in court
to object to the method of service should indicate that he has
received notice and preclude any further objection. However, while
the tone of the CPLR is liberal, careless methods of service should
not be encouraged by giving too loose a meaning to section 308(1).
While due process is satisfied by notice and an opportunity to be
heard the "notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach
2447 Misc. 2d 213, 262 N.Y.S2d 44 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1965).
25 CPLR 30(1) : "Personal service upon a natural person shall be made:
(1) by delivering the summons within the state to the person to be
served. ... "26See, e.g., Ives v. Darling, 210 App. Div. 521, 206 N.Y. Supp. 493
(3d Dep't 1924).27 E.g., Marcy v. Woodin, 18 App. Div. 2d 944, 237 N.Y.S.2d 402 (3d
Dep't 1963); Bleil v. Clark, (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County), 151 N.Y.L.J., March
31, 1964, p. 16, col. 3.
28 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. AxN. § 262.06(1) (b).
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interested parties." 29 It would seem then that a defendant would
be justified in objecting to service which was not "reasonably
calculated" to reach him but by some quirk of fate managed to come
into his hands. Therefore, any such method should not be condoned
by the courts.
CPLR 308(3): Mailing to "last known residence" not valid where
plaintiff knows that defendant no longer resides theie.
In Zelnick v. Bartlik3 0 service at defendant's "last known
residence" was alleged to be defective on the ground that the
process server was apprised of the fact that the defendant no longer
lived at that address. In fact, the summons was left with the
defendant's wife whom he had abandoned. The court, under these
circumstances, held that the service of process was not "reasonably
calculated to give actual notice" and, hence, was not sufficient to
render the defendant subject to the court's jurisdiction.
The instant case is in accord with Polansky v. Paugh 31 and
Jauk v. Mello.3 2 In the Jauk case, mailing and affixing (or delivery)
was to the same address. And while it cannot be ascertained with
any degree of certainty, it appears that such was the case in Polansky.
A different situation is involved, however, where the mailing is to
a "last known residence" which the plaintiff knows is no longer
defendant's residence but the "'affixing" or "delivery" is to a place
where the defendant, in fact, works or dwells. One commentator
would mke the validity of the service last alluded to dependent
upon whether the plaintiff knew, or did not know, that the de-
fendant no longer lived at his "last known residence." 33 This does
not appear entirely logical since what is important is whether the
defendant can reasonably be said to have received actual notice
of the pendency of the action. Although plaintiff may have actual
knowledge that defendant no longer resides at his "last known
residence" service should not be set aside where the "affixing" or
"dalivery" is to a place where defendant in fact lives or works.
In stich a case, it would appear that due process requirements would
be satisfied.
A difficult situation is presented where plaintiff knows that the
defendant no longer lives at his "last known residence," and also
knows the defendant's place of business or abode-but does not
know defendant's present residence. Perhaps plaintiff's best sbFition
29 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318
-(1950).
3046 Misc. 2d 1043, 261 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1965).
3123 App. Div. 2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.Zd 961 (1st Dep't 1965).
3245 Misc. 2d 307, 256 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964).
33 713 McKni;NE 's CPLR 308, supp. commentary 77 (1965).
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